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"This little yellow Cuban biplane opened a diplomatic
'
Pandora'sbox when it touched down at the Key West airport."

I. INTRODUCTION

In November 2002, an Antonov Colt biplane 2 owned by the Cuban
government was stolen from a Havana airfield and flown to Key West,
Florida, in a daring attempt by eight Cuban citizens to gain political
asylum.3 The incident was not the first of its kind; in recent years, Cuban
defectors increasingly have taken to the skies4 in their ninety-mile journey
to reach American soil5 in the Florida Keys. 6 In addition to many affable

1. CNN Newsnight (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 25, 2003), transcript available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0304/25/asb.01.html.
2. The aircraft is a Russian-made Antonov An-2. The model was built between the 1940s
and 1960s and is regarded internationally as an antiquated but nonetheless dependable utility
aircraft. See WARBIRD ALLEY, ANTONOV AN-2 "COLT", at http://www.warbirdalley.com/an2.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004). "With the collapse of the communist regime.., a small number of An2s have begun to appear on the civilian rosters in Europe and the United States." Id. Enthusiasts
surmise that internationally, only about two thousand models are currently in airworthy condition.
Id These rare vestiges of a fading era can be sold for thirty to forty thousand dollars. Jennifer
Babson, Cuban Spy's Ex- Wife Buys Controversial Plane atAuction, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14, 2003,
at lB.
3. Nemencio Carlos Alsonse Guerra, a 48-year old aircraft pilot employed by the Cuban
government, concocted the November 1, 2002 escape. Vanessa Bauza et al., Cuban Pilot, Family
Flee to US.: Communist Party Member Was Unlikely Defector, Relatives Say, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL, Nov. 12, 2002, at IA. That morning, Guerra reported to work at La Cubana air strip,
where he was expected to perform regular maintenance on the biplane-a single-engine aircraft
regularly flown by Guerra to dust neighboring crops. Id. Seven other Cuban citizens met Guerra
at the airstrip, and they took off for the United States. Id.
4. According to one journalist, there was "a long line" ofunannounced air arrivals carrying
Cuban defectors between 1987 and the biplane incident in 2002. Id.
5. The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act's "Wet feet, Dry feet" policy provides that Cubans who
reach United States shores are generally permitted to stay, while those caught in transit are usually
taken back to Cuba. See Roland Estevez, Note, Modern Application ofthe Cuban Adjustment Act
of 1966 and Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1273, 1290 (2002).
6. A large concrete buoy on a pier in Key West, Florida, marks the southernmost point in
the continental United States. The marker, which is a popular tourist attraction, features a sign that
announces "90 Miles to Cuba." See ROADSIDEAMERICA.COM, SOUTHERNMOST POINT IN THE US,

at http://www.roadsideamerica.com/attract/FLKEYsouthernmost.html (last visited Oct. 31,2004).
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but unexpected arrivals, blatantly aggressive incidents of air piracy by
Cuban defectors have become far more common.7
Although the biplane's arrival may not have been extraordinary, a fiery
controversy quickly erupted. The debate focused on the ultimate
disposition of the mustard-yellow biplane with peeling paint and fading
Cuban insignia. International law seemed to provide a clear instruction.
According to the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft8 (Hague Convention), a treaty signed by Cuba and the
United States, 9 participating nations are required to deliver unlawfully
seized aircraft "to the persons lawfully entitled to possession."'" The
United States always has followed this mandate and returned aircraft to
Cuba." However, in the case of the biplane, international law did not
provide the prevailing principle. A seemingly unrelated action brought in
a Miami court by a Cuban-American woman, Ana Margarita Martinez,
significantly altered the legal framework and ultimately led to a
that many considered a flagrant disregard of international
disposition
2
law.'
7. These incidents have become quite frequent:
Between 1961 and 1989, more than one hundred American passenger planes were
hijacked and diverted to Cuba. During this period, Cuban and United States
authorities developed routine procedures designed to deal with the hijackings with
minimal inconvenience to all parties. Ordinarily, U.S. authorities notify the
Havana control tower that an American airplane has been hijacked, and that its
probable destination is the Josd Marti airport in Cuba. Upon the aircraft's arrival,
the hijacker typically surrenders to Cuban authorities and is arrested.
Mark W. Levine, Note, Cuban Hijackers and the United States: The Need for a Modified Aut
Dedere Aut Judicare Rule, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 143 (1994) (footnote omitted).
Describing hijackings in the 1980s, ajournalist explained: "Cuban authorities allowed the planes
to be flown back to the United States within hours in most cases, after the hijacker or hijackers were
removed and passengers were often allowed to stock up on rum and cigars." Jennifer Babson,
Seized Cuban Planes Propel Diplomacy Debate, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 2003, at 1A."The
unscheduled stops had become such a headache that in July 1983, the Federal Aviation
Administration announced plans to begin a radio-television campaign stressing that hijackers would
face tough treatment in Cuba." Id.
8. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. For the United States'
implementing legislation, see 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (2000).
9. See Conventionfor the Suppression of UnlawfulSeizure ofAircraft Signed atthe Hague
on 16 December 1970, at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/lebfhague.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
10. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
11. CNN WolfBlitzer Reports(CNN television broadcast, Dec. 16,2002), transcript available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0212/16/wbr.00.html; see also supra note 7
(describing the pattern of informal treatment of these incidents by both the United States and Cuban
governments).
12. Professor Berta Hernandez-Truyol summarized many of the concerns: "'I think it's
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In 2001, Martinez sued the Cuban government for civil damages
stemming from sexual battery committed by her husband. 3 Martinez
brought the lawsuit when she discovered that her husband, Juan Pablo
Roque, was a Cuban spy who married her only to gain access to the Miami
exile community. 14 Martinez argued that since her husband never informed
her of his actual identity, he procured her consent to a marital relationship
fraudulently. 5 Therefore, any intimate acts that occurred within that
marriage constituted rape. 6 The jury found in her favor and awarded her
a judgment of $27.1 million against the Cuban government.' 7
While Martinez's marriage to Roque was regrettably ill-fated, her
ability to seek a legal remedy for these wrongs resulted from an almost

dangerous, I think it's inappropriate, I don't think we should do it' ... 'The government would not
allow one individual to take over its foreign policy."' Babson, supra note 7.
13. See CNN Newsnight, supra note 1.
14. Id. The two met in 1992 at a church gathering in Miami; Roque claimed he was a "highranking Cuban military defector." Id.; see also CNNNewsnight, supra note 1.Catherine Mitchell,
the reporter, explained, "Roque courted [Martinez] persistently for three years and married her in
1995, on, of all days, April Fools' Day." Id.The marriage was integral to Roque's spy mission
because, as Martinez stated, "We gave him the appearance that he was here to stay, that he was a
family man." Id. (quoting Martinez). Martinez discovered that her husband was a spy when he
mysteriously left the United States and reappeared in Havana after the Cuban military shot down
a pair of civilian aircraft. Cuban Plane Seized to Satisfy Judgment, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Florida), Dec. 5, 2002, at 5B. The planes were used by Brothers to the Rescue on a peaceful
mission to locate and assist Cuban refugees in the Florida Straits. Id. Roque "even became a pilot
for Brothers to the Rescue, an anti-communist group. But a year after the wedding, Roque abruptly
returned to Havana and denounced Brothers to the Rescue on television." CNN Wolf Blitzer
Reports, supra note 11. In the wake of the shooting, FBI agents descended on Martinez's home.
CNNNewsnight, supra note 1. Martinez explained her startling discovery: "[S]uddenly, . . . I was
told by one of the reporters that was outside. . . 'Turn on CNN.' And when I [did] that, I [saw
Roque] walking down from an... airplane in Havana." Id.(quoting Martinez). As Martinez
watched, "Roque announced on television that he was a Cuban spy and denounced Brothers to the
Rescue as a terrorist organization." Id. (quoting Catherine Mitchell).
15. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 13, 2002), availableat LEXIS, CBS News
Transcripts. Martinez sued the Cuban government for the intentional tort of rape, arguing that the
government was liable because Roque was merely acting as an agent. Id.
16. Id.
17. Babson, supra note 7. The Cuban government never arrived to defend itself in court. As
one author notes, this is not unusual in cases filed under modern exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity. Terrorist-StateLitigation in 2002-03, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 966, 966 (2003) (citing
Peterson v. Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003), as but one example of this phenomenon); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 459 (1987) (authorizing
default judgments in such cases: "[a] judgment of default may be rendered against a foreign state
if, after having been duly served.., the state fails to make a timely answer or other responsive
pleading to the complaint, fails to appear at trial, or otherwise fails to defend the action in
accordance with applicable procedure"); Allison Taylor, Note, Another Front in the War on
Terrorism? Problemswith Recent Changes to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 533, 537 (2003) (citing Alejandre v. Republic ofCuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997),
as another case in which the defendant nation did not appear in court).
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celestial alignment of recent laws and political determinations. 8 Although
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 9 (FSIA) bars most private
lawsuits by American citizens against foreign governments, more recent
enactments enabled Martinez to bring suit. z° The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 199621 (AEDPA) amended the FSIA to
allow private actions against foreign governments if the plaintiff alleges
an injury caused by an act of terrorism by an officially designated terrorist
state.22 Only weeks after the biplane touched ground on the Key West
tarmac, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 200223
(TRIA). 24 This Act buttressed Martinez's lawsuit by permitting her to
enforce her judgment against a much wider range of assets.25 Pursuant to
this statute, the judge presiding over Martinez's case issued an order to
seize and auction the biplane as an item of property belonging to the
defendant Cuban government.26

18. For a thorough discussion of the legal developments that enabled Martinez to sue the
Cuban government and enforce her judgment by attaching the biplane to her lawsuit, see infra Part
III.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000). Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
foreign states are generally immune from lawsuits unless the suit arises from:
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
20. As discussed in Part III of this Note, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
permitted Martinez to bring suit, and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act enabled her to enforce her
judgment against a broader range of property.
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610 (2000). For a discussion of the AEDPA's impact on the FSIA,
see Monroe Leigh, 1996 Amendments to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act with Respect to
TerroristActivities, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 187-88 (2003).
22. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610;
Leigh, supra note 21, at 188.
23. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. The biplane landed at Key West on November 1, 2002. Bauza et al., supra note 3. The
TRIA was signed into law on November 26, 2002. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322.
25. The TRIA amended the FSIA by entitling individuals with judgments against a
designated terrorist state to claim assets "of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party."
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201; Joseph G. Jarret, The Business of Terrorism: The
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 77 FLA. BAR J. 63, 64 (2003). In 1996, the United States
included Cuba on an official list of seven state sponsors of terrorism. See Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2004) (listing as State sponsors of
terrorism Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan).
26. Martinez's $27.1 millionjudgment is expected to be fulfilled gradually, primarily through
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The Cuban government argued that these domestic laws should not
modify prior promises made by the United States.27 Citing the Hague
Convention,28 the Cuban government labeled the attachment ofthe biplane
to Martinez's lawsuit "a flagrant violation ' 29 of the law and demanded that
the United States return the aircraft and the eight Cuban defectors.3" The
United States government declined to intervene,3 and the biplane was
auctioned in January 2003.32
If we think of this case as a classic debate over ownership and
possession, then the auction undoubtedly resolved the matter.33 However,
if we reflect on the entire occurrence as a political problem with likely
international ramifications, then the impact of this "little yellow Cuban
biplane"34 remains a complex and open-ended question. Most importantly,
the incident may have set the dangerous precedent that an individual can,
at the trial court level, vastly disrupt foreign relations by dissolving a
foreign government's ownership interest in property that normally would
be protected by international agreements.35 One United States government
official explained the potential impact of this so-called "plaintiffs
diplomacy" thus: "' [I]f some American Airlines plane on the way from
Puerto Rico ended up in Havana, we'd expect the Cubans to give us our
airplane back' .... ,,36 Worldwide, the aviation industry and its civilian

seizure of frozen assets in American banks. CNN WolfBlitzer Reports, supra note 11.
27. As CNN's Mark Potter explained, "The president of Cuba's National Assembly call[ed]
the seizure of this aircraft a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of migratory agreements
between Cuba and the United States." Id.
28. See supra note 8.
29. CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports, supra note 11.
30. CNNNewsnight, supra note 1.
31. The Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) probably released the defectors to
their families in the United States and declined to bring criminal charges against the pilot;
government officials also refused to take any action or make any official statements regarding the
proper disposition of the biplane. Bauza et al., supra note 3. In response to this decision, Cuban
"President Fidel Castro led, a rally outside the American mission in Havana." Cuba: Thousands
ProtestAgainst US., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A6.
32. When few bidders turned out for the sale, Martinez chose to buy the plane for seven
thousand dollars with hopes of reselling it for a higher price. See Babson, supra note 2.
33. The auction would have passed bona fide title to the purchaser, thereby finalizing
disposition of the biplane.
34. See supra note I and accompanying text.
35. See Babson, supra note 7. Courts and commentators have argued that plaintiffs should
not be able to impact foreign relations so profoundly. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
Bosco, Plaintiffls Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102. But see Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1998) (asserting that private causes of action against
state sponsors of terrorism are just one more means by which America can effectively combat
terrorism).
36. Babson, supranote 7. Rick Asper, a Florida aviation attorney, explained, "'Our interests
are substantially higher-the aircraft at risk from hijacking from the U.S. to Cuba are not Antonovs
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passengers depend on participating nations to honor international
agreements.37 Yet domestically, the United States has an interest in
compensating victims of terrorism and deterring future violence by
allowing plaintiffs to enforce judgments against foreign nations. The
biplane, as an item of property belonging to the Cuban government and
resting on American soil, provided an opportunity to compensate
Martinez. Thus, the case presents a unique opportunity to investigate the
intersection of two bodies of law that each grapple with international
terrorism. While the fate of the biplane already has been determined, the
case is worth revisiting because of the likelihood that the same controversy
will arise the next time an aircraft owned by an officially designated state
sponsor of terrorism is unlawfully seized and brought to the United
States.38 Throughout this Note, I discuss the "case of the biplane"; by this
nomenclature I refer to a past incident as well as to all future cases in
which the same statute and treaty conflict. 9
Part H of this Note analyzes the three international agreements that
define and protect foreign ownership interests in civil aircraft, with special
focus on their cumulative force in defining the applicable language of the
Hague Convention. Part III focuses on the evolution of domestic laws that
allow Americans to bring suit against state sponsors of terrorism. In
anticipation of the interest analysis provided in subsequent sections, Parts
H and I1 provide detailed legislative histories of the conflicting laws,
including relevant predecessor laws. Part IV considers whether traditional
canons of construction can resolve the apparent conflict and finds that

that are worth $40,000. We are talking about Boeings."' Id.
37. See generally Shadrach A. Stanleigh, Note, "Excess Baggage" at the F.A.A.: Analyzing
the TensionBetween "Open Skies" and Safety Policingin US. InternationalCivilAviation Policy,
23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 965 (1998) (discussing the "open skies" doctrine as a civil aviation industry
development, mostly prompted by American airline corporations, and tracing its origins in
international agreements).
38. In fact, two other aircraft landed in the Florida Keys after the biplane and also were
auctioned to fulfill Martinez's judgment against Cuba. Two Hijacked Cuban Planes To Be
Auctioned in Florida,AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 29,2003 ("The aging DC-3 and Antonov An24 planes were hijacked to Key West, Florida on March 19 and April 1. Both carried about 30
passengers on a domestic Cuban route when they were hijacked."). The two aircraft sold
significantly below market value: the Antonov An-24 sold for $6500, while the DC-3 sold for
$12,500. See Cuban Aircraft, Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2003, at A29. Demonstrating the
significant difference between sales price and fair market value, the purchaser of the An-24
immediately listed the aircraft for sale on eBay and drew a selling price of almost $60,000. Aircraft
Sold on eBayfor USD59, 100, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFO., July 14, 2003 ("The eBay auction lasted
for a ten-day period and received 96 bids before it ended.").
39. Most likely, these future aircraft would be from Cuba. However, the same questions
would arise in the case of an aircraft from any nation identified as a state sponsor of terrorism, since
the TRIA also would apply to all property that belongs to those nations and arrives on American
soil. See supra note 23.
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these strict rules do not provide a consistent answer. Part V introduces
interest analysis, an approach used in interstate conflicts4" jurisprudence.
Part V also considers the legislative interests behind the competing laws,
finding that the comparative impairment approach may be the most
appropriate for resolving intrajurisdictional conflicts between statutes and
treaties. This Note concludes with a broad recommendation that courts
apply interest analysis to resolve intrajurisdictional conflict of laws
questions, rather than perform concealed interest analyses under the guise
of mechanical application of selected canons. Additionally, this Note
recommends that in the case of the biplane, lawmakers should create an
exception for civil aircraft that is similar to the immunity currently
afforded to diplomatic and consular property.4 This change is essential
because canons of construction cannot produce a predictable outcome. A
decisive answer, however, is necessary in this conflicts question; both the
continued protection of the civil aviation industry and the steadfast
deterrence of air piracy depend on consistent application of international
agreements. With humanity still reeling from the tragic events of
September 11, 2001,42 it is perhaps more important than ever to preserve
the same set of international agreements that helped a shocked world
regain confidence in civil aviation in the aftermath of World War II. 4
I]. MULTILATERAL TREATIES THAT DEFINE AND PROTECT FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFT

In the years following World War II, lingering tensions among nations
had to be reconciled with a dramatic increase in the use of aircraft for nonmilitary purposes." Although political hostilities may entice nations to

40. Conflict of laws is the body of law that concerns those cases in which "[e]vents and
transactions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant relationship to more than one state,
making necessary a special body of rules and methods for their ordering and resolution."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 466 (1987)
(summarizing the major tenets of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations as follows: "[t]he premises, archives, documents, and
communications of an accredited diplomatic mission or consular post are inviolable, and are
immune from any exercise of jurisdiction by the receiving state that would interfere with their
official use").
42. For discussion of the impact of September 11 on the civil aviation industry, see Laurence
Zuckerman, A Day of Terror: The Airlines: For the FirstTime, the Nation's EntireAirspaceIs Shut
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al 9 (explaining that the decision immediately to shut down
all American airspace to commercial aircraft was without precedent).
43. See infraPart II (discussing the emergence of multi ateral treaties governing civil aviation
in the years following World War II).
44. See Angela Edwards, Note& Comment, ForeignInvestment in the US. AirlineIndustry:
Friendor Foe?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 595, 598 (1995) (noting that the Chicago Convention,
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detain, seize, or take hostile actions against foreign aircraft, an emerging
civil aviation industry of an "inherent[ly] international character"4' relies
upon friendly cooperation between otherwise apprehensive regimes.46 In
addition, airplanes are imperfect machines that can be steered off course
by weather, mechanical problems, or intentional and unintentional acts of
humans,4" so that any nation's aircraft can be forced to land in unfriendly
territory. Mindful of these realities, the global community sought to
establish a body of international law to protect civil aircraft. 8
A. The Chicago Convention of 1944
The Convention on International Civil Aviation"9 was the world's first
attempt to create special rules for civil aircraft."0 The agreement, dubbed
the Chicago Convention, 5 was intended to protect the aviation industry,
as well as each nation's geopolitical and security interests.52 So that
nations could provide more flexible access for civil aircraft without
compromising domestic security, the Chicago Convention mandated a
uniform system of aircraft registration and regulation.53 Additionally, the

which attempted to develop international air diplomacy, was a response to the post-World War II
rise in civil aviation).
45. Terena Penteado Rodrigues, International Regulation of Interests in Aircraft: The
BrazilianReality and the UNIDROITProposal,65 J.AIR L. & CoM. 279, 281 (2000).
46. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against
Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 649, 661 (2003) (explaining that the two World Wars
were a major "catalyst" for international aviation treaties).
47. For a thorough discussion of various misfortunes that can occur mid-flight and their legal
implications, see generally Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and PassengerDisturbances
Under the Warsaw Convention,16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 891 (2001).
48. See Dempsey, supra note 46.
49. Convention on Int'l Civil Aviation, openedfor signatureDec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
50. The Chicago Convention is applicable only to civil aircraft, "and shall not be applicable
to state aircraft." Id. at art. 3(a). "Aircraft used in military, customs, and police services shall be
deemed to be state aircraft." Id. at art. 3(b).
51. The agreement's nomenclature reflects its history; it was developed and ratified at a
meeting in Chicago. See id., Signature of Convention.
52. The preamble explains, "the future development of international civil aviation can greatly
help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the
world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security." Id., Preamble. Although
participating nations wished to preserve the doctrine of exclusive sovereign control of airspace,
they also recognized that an evolving international civil aviation industry would necessitate broader
rights of entry for non-military aircraft. See, e.g., id. at art. 25. The doctrine of state control over
airspace was recognized and codified by the international community at the 1919 Paris Conference,
held after the First World War. Ved P. Nanda, SubstantialOwnershipandControl ofInternational
Airlines in the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 357, 358 (2002) (discussing the Convention for
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173).
53. The Chicago Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organization
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Chicago Convention sought to protect foreign ownership and security
interests in aircraft. The agreement provides that "[a]n aircraft cannot be
validly registered in more than one State, but its registration may be
changed from one State to another."" a Transfers must comply with the
rules of the nation in which the aircraft was previously registered.55 These
provisions serve to deter governments from seizing foreign aircraft
because unregistered aircraft are not considered airworthy under the laws
of any signatory nation.56
B. The Convention on the InternationalRecognition of Rights
in Aircraft of 1948
In 1948, delegates to the Convention on the International Recognition
of Rights in Aircraft57 established and signed the Geneva Convention.58
The agreement strengthened the Chicago Convention's mandates by
reaffirming participating nations' dedication to the protection of ownership
rights in aircraft59 and by avowing the supremacy of these international
mandates. 60 Article I provides that "[n]othing in this Convention shall
prevent the recognition of any rights in aircraft under the law of any
Contracting State; but Contracting States shall not admit or recognise any
right as taking priority over the" property rights, security interests, or
rights acquired by contract or lease in the aircraft's nation of origin.61 The
Geneva Convention also strengthened the registration provisions of the
Chicago Convention by prohibiting transfer of ownership from one nation

(ICAO), which "is given responsibility for regulating the many technical aspects of international
civil aviation .... [T]he jurisdiction of the ICAO includes such matters as aircraft licensing,
airworthiness certification, registration of aircraft, international operating standards, and airways
and communications controls." Dempsey, supra note 46, at 661-62.
54. Chicago Convention, supra note 49, at art. 18.
55. Id.at art. 19.
56. Id.at art. 31.
57. Convention for the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, June 19, 1948, 4
U.S.T. 1830, 310 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
58. The treaty is abbreviated this way because the agreement was signed at Geneva. See id.
59. See id. The overall intent of the parties to the Geneva Convention is succinctly expressed
in the second "whereas" clause: "WHEREAS it is highly desirable in the interest of the future
expansion of international civil aviation that rights in aircraft be recognised internationally....
Id.
60. See infra text accompanying note 61.
61. Geneva Convention, supra note 57, at art. I. Lorne Clark and Jeffrey Wool provide a
useful example of the Geneva Convention in operation: "State X agrees to recognize proprietary
rights in aircraft created in State Y, the State where the aircraft in [sic] registered for nationality
purposes under the Chicago Convention." Lorne Clark & Jeffrey Wool, Entry into Force of
Transactional Private Law Treaties Affecting Aviation: Case Study-Proposed UNIDROIT/ICAO
Convention as Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1403, 1412 n.32 (2001).
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of recorded rights have been satisfied or
to another "unless all holders
62
consent to the transfer.,
C. The Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure ofAircraft of 1970
While the preceding agreements focused on broad issues of ownership
in aircraft, the Hague Convention was a significantly more targeted
accord-participating nations primarily sought to reduce incidents of air
piracy.63 Specifically, the drafters were concerned that unlawful seizures
of aircraft threatened the civil aviation industry and posed a serious risk to
liberty and property interests within member states. 64
Although the agreement does not focus on aircraft ownership per se, it
contains important provisions that strengthen the goals articulated in the
Chicago and Geneva Conventions. Article IX mandates that "[Contracting
States] shall without delay return the [unlawfully seized] aircraft and its
cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession., 65 This provision is
consistent with the international community's twice-articulated desire to
protect foreign ownership interests in aircraft unexpectedly brought under
another nation's jurisdiction.66 Therefore, when interpreted in light of the
preceding two treaties, the Hague Convention sets out a clear course of
conduct for the United States government: a Cuban aircraft that is
unlawfully seized and brought to the United States in an act of air piracy
should be returned at once to its original owner in Cuba, even if the owner
is the Cuban government. However, when considered separately, the
phrase "lawful owner" also can describe a person entitled to ownership of
the aircraft under international or domestic law.6 7 Indeed, this was
Martinez's argument, and it ultimately won her title to the aircraft based

62. Geneva Convention, supra note 57, at art. IX.
63. See Hague Convention, supra note 8. The Preamble begins with the following clauses:
"Considering that unlawful acts of seizure or exercise of control of aircraft in flight jeopardize the
safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, and undermine the
confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of civil aviation," and "[c]onsidering that the
occurrence of such acts is a matter of grave concern .... Id.
64. See id. Much of the Hague Convention concentrates on the handling of hijacking
suspects. See id. at arts. 6-8. In fact, the treaty is most often cited for the establishment of a model
international extradition process. See Christopher C. Joyner, InternationalExtraditionand Global
Terrorism:BringingInternationalCriminalsto Justice, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 493,
509-13 (2003).
65. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
66. These goals already had been expressed in the Chicago and Geneva Conventions. See
supra Parts II.A-B.
67. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
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on a complex weave of domestic laws that defined her right to sue and
enforce her judgment against the nation of Cuba.68
III. DOMESTIC LAWS THAT ALLOW AMERICANS TO BRING AND
ENFORCE LAWSUITS AGAINST FOREIGN NATIONS

While the international agreements discussed above typically would
govern questions of foreign ownership interests in aircraft, the case of the
biplane becomes more complicated once domestic laws factor into the
analysis. As noted above, the aircraft was not simply foreign-owned; a
sovereign government, the nation of Cuba, was the registered title-holder.
Adding to the complexity is the fact that the Cuban government occupies
a special status under American law as a federally designated state
supporter of terrorism.69 As the following discussion reveals, this label
fundamentally alters the analysis and places the biplane in a rather unique
choice-of-law quandary.
A. ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Martinez asserted rights vested by fairly recently enacted laws, but the
concept behind those laws is not new.7 ° The laws upon which Martinez's
suit was based are the culmination of a long history of congressional
attempts to expand plaintiffs' abilities to bring suits and enforce judgment
awards against foreign governments. In order to establish a more thorough
context for the recent enactments in this area, some attention must be
given to earlier developments. This inquiry begins with the FSIA. 7
Traditionally, foreign governments enjoyed absolute immunity from
the jurisdiction of another nation's courts." The modem global
marketplace began to challenge this traditional rule, as governments
increasingly contracted with foreign corporations and individuals.73

68. See infra Part 111.
69. See supra note 23.
70. Martinez's claim was pursuant to the AEDPA, see infra Part Ill.B, and the TRIA, see
infra Part III.E.
71. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
72. See Foreign Terrorism and US. Courts: Hearings on S. 825, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practiceof the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 57 (1994) (testimony of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State).
73. One court explained the evolution of the modem theory ofsovereign immunity as a direct
result of "the rise of Communism and the consequent outgrowth of state trading and shipping
companies.... [T]he United States began to recognize the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity, which permitted suits arising from a foreign state's commercial activities." Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing S. SUCHARITKUL, STATE
IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); W. Friedmann, Changing
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Impenetrable foreign sovereign immunity disadvantaged private parties to
such contracts because it removed the opportunity to seek a judicial
remedy against a contracting nation in the event of a breach.74 States began
carving out exceptions to the doctrine, particularly in the area of
commercial transactions." The United States codified this emerging
"restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity in the 1976 FSIA.76 Under this
revised doctrine, neither a state nor its agent is immune from the
jurisdiction of other nations' courts when the lawsuit involves claims that
could be brought against a private party." As the following discussion
reveals, while the FSIA remains the default rule for lawsuits brought by
American persons against foreign governments, modem changes have
further restricted foreign sovereign immunity.

Social Arrangements in State-TradingStates and Their Effect on InternationalLaw, 24 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 350 (1959)).
74. See Margot C. Wuebbels, Note, CommercialTerrorism:A CommercialActivityException
Under§1605(A)(2) ofthe ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 35 ARIZ.L. REV. 1123, 1124, 1127
(1993) (explaining the history of, and rationale for, the commercial activities exception).
75. Boxer v. Gottlieb, 652 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The United States
government formally accepted a "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity on May 19,
1952, when it published the "Tate Letter." See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprintedin Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, app. 2 at 711 (1976).
76. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605 (2000). A court lacks jurisdiction over any case that does
not come within one of the enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity set forth in the
FSIA. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) ("Under the [FSIA], a foreign state is
presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception
applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.");
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (finding that the
FSIA was "the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state" in American courts). As
the FSIA's legislative history reveals, the law was intended to be the exclusive source of law for
foreign sovereign immunity determinations. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 11 ("In 1976, in order to
promote uniform and apolitical determinations, Congress transferred immunity determinations from
the Department of State to the judiciary and otherwise essentially codified the... restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity in the FSIA.") (citing the legislative history contained in H.R. REP.
No. 94-1487 (1976)).
77. Boxer, 652 F. Supp. at 1060. Conduct that cannot be classified as commercial or tortious
was deemed purely governmental under the FSIA and continued to enjoy the benefit of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(finding that a government does not come under the jurisdiction of the federal court when a
governmental agent kidnaps an American citizen since the act of kidnapping is not commercial or
tortious conduct as per the FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity). When sovereign immunity
applies, immunity is not merely an affirmative defense to be declared during proceedings. Instead,
it is an absolute bar to litigation and the foreign government need not even respond to initial
pleadings. Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Congress passed the AEDPA78 in response to tragic terrorist attacks on
American soil in the early 1990s. 7 9 The AEDPA marked a significant
narrowing of foreign sovereign immunity8" because it broadened the tort
liability exposure of certain foreign governments and created new avenues
of compensation for victims.8' The AEDPA was also a sharply targeted
piece of legislation, rooted in a clearly recognizable objective to deter
international terrorism82 and provide restitution to Americans injured by
the actions of hostile governments.83
Title II of the AEDPA carved out new exceptions to the FSIA for
governments that have been designated by the United States Department
of State as supporters of terrorism.84 Currently, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Syria, and Sudan are included in this list.85 Once a
government is designated a state sponsor of terrorism, Americans may
bring suit against it for compensatory damages arising from acts of
"torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking"
committed by the foreign government or its agent,86 or for materially

78. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § § 1605, 1610 (2000).
79. CHARLES DOYLE, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, ANTITERRORISM AND
(June 3, 1996), at
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996: A SUMMARY
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/96-499.htm. The author explains, however, that these incidents were not
the only reasons for the Act's passage:
The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and to
a lesser extent the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, supplied the
most obvious stimuli for its enactment, but concern over other issues such as
habeas corpus and immigration contributed to its passage as well.
Id.
80. But see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The ForeignSovereign ImmunitiesAct andHuman Rights
Violations: One Step Forward,Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 71, 84 (1998) (arguing
that the amendment to the FSIA should have gone much further, so that plaintiffs could sue a
broader range of nations for a more extensive spectrum of human rights violations).
81. DOYLE, supra note 79.
82. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining the
legislative goals behind the AEDPA).
83. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; William P. Hoye, Fighting
Fire with... Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on State-SponsoredTerrorism, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 105, 150 (2002).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000).
85. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 596.201
(2004).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A). The Flatowcourt elucidated the current state of the law: "The
law of respondeat superior demonstrates that if a foreign state's agent, official or employee
provides material support and resources to a terrorist organization, such provision will be
considered an act within the scope of his or her agency, office or employment." 999 F. Supp. at 18.
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supporting an act of terrorism.87 Later, Congress amended Title IIto allow
punitive damages.88
In addition to creating new opportunities for Americans to pursue
claims against foreign governments,89 the drafters of the AEDPA also

However, the court went on to explain that "[i]n order for an agent, official, or employee's unlawful
conduct to be imputed to a government... the government must share a degree of responsibility
for the wrongful conduct. The government must have engaged in the wrongful conduct, either
deliberately or permissively, as a matter of policy or custom." Id. (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). As the Flatow court further explained, a causal connection
between the support and the harmful act is not necessary because:
a plaintiff need not establish that the material support or resources provided by a
foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to the act from which his claim
arises in order to satisfy [FSIA]'s statutory requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction. Sponsorship of a terrorist group which causes the personal injury or
death of a United States national alone is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.
999 F. Supp. at 18.
88. On September 30, 1996, Congress added a statutory note, entitled "Civil Liability for
Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism," to 28 U.S.C. § 1605. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat.
3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)). That note explains, in pertinent part:
(a) An official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor
of terrorism ... while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment,
or agency shall be liable to the United States national or the national's legal
representative for personal injury or death caused by acts of that official,
employee, or agent . . . for money damages which may include economic
damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages....
Id. (emphasis added). One court provided a detailed summary of the legislative intent behind the
punitive damages exception:
Although the Antiterrorism Act created a forum competent to adjudicate claims
arising from offenses of this nature, serious issues remained, in particular, the
causes of action available to plaintiffs. . . . [I]n order for the exception for
immunity to have the desired deterrent effect, the potential civil liability for
foreign states which commit and sponsor acts of terrorism would have to be
substantial. Therefore, the amendment ... expressly provided, inter alia, that
punitive damages were available in actions brought under the state sponsored
terrorism exception to immunity.
Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12 (citations omitted).
89. Indeed, many suits were brought following passage of this Act, and plaintiffs often were
awarded large compensatory and punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Anderson v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000) (awarding a kidnapped journalist and his family
compensatory damages of approximately $24.5 million and punitive damages of $300 million
against the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.
Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding the families of the Brothers to the Rescue pilots who were
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sought to expand a plaintiff's ability to collect judgments against foreign
governments.9" Specifically, the AEDPA declares that any property owned
by a state sponsor of terrorism is subject to attachment in a civil lawsuit
maintained pursuant to one of the exceptions to the FSIA if the property
is located within the United States and used for commercial purposes.91
Notwithstanding this revision, the task of collecting against foreign
governments remained virtually impossible, and plaintiffs who brought
lawsuits under the new exception typically were unable to enforce their
judgments.92
C. Omnibus Consolidatedand Emergency Supplemental
AppropriationsAct of 1999
The rights afforded to plaintiffs under the AEDPA would be
meaningless if plaintiffs were not able to collect judgments.93 Recognizing
this reality, lawmakers began to pass laws that would allow the
enforcement of judgments against broader ranges of property owned by
defendant governments. The first of these, contained within the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 19999'
(OCESA), was a bold legislative attempt to enable courts to attach an
shot-down by the Cuban Air Force almost $12 million in economic losses,. approximately $38
million for pain and suffering, and $137.7 million in punitive damages).
90. Congress amended section 1610 of the FSIA by adding the following provision:
The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a)
of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be
immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon ajudgment
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this
Act, if ... the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not
immune under section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was
involved with the act upon which the claim is based.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7).
91. Id. § 1610; see also supra note 76.
92. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the plaintiff did not prove that Bank Saderat Iran was an entity of the state of Iran
subject to execution of ajudgment against Iran based on a suit brought under the newly amended
FSIA).
93. Although it is never entirely clear whether the goal of deterrence has been achieved, it
seems fairly certain that deterrence can work only when the threatened response is carried out. In
this context, deterrence can be achieved only if nations are required to pay the judgements against
them. Similarly, compensation of victims is achieved only when a transfer of wealth occurs. Large
judgments that are left unpaid may provide a symbolic victory, but they do little to advance these
important goals.
94. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). The legislation added 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) and modified 28
U.S.C. § 1606, 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
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almost limitless range of property owned by an officially designated
terrorist state.95 First, the OCESA authorized attachment of blocked
property,96 or those assets frozen by the President pursuant to the Trading
with the Enemy Act of 191717 or the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. 98 In addition, the OCESA expressly permitted courts to attach
and enforce judgments against diplomatic and consular properties, despite
special protections afforded under international law.99

95. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 §
117, 112 Stat. at 2681-491.
96. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(a)(f)(1)(a) (West 2004) (explaining that American courts hearing a
case pursuant to the FSIA may attach any property "with respect to which financial transactions are
prohibited or regulated pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App.
5(b)), section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)), [or] sections 202
and 203 of the International Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1702)").
97. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2000). The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 provides executive
authority during times of war to:
[I]nvestigate, regulate . . .nullify, void . . . or prohibit, any ... transactions
involving.., any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest ...and any property or interest of any foreign country or national
thereof shall vest... upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or
person as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall
be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest
of and for the benefit of the United States.
Id. § 5(b).
98. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707. This act permits a President, in times of national emergency,
to exercise essentially the same powers provided in the Trading with the Enemies Act. Id.; cf supra
note 97. In addition, "when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked
by a foreign [entity]," this section permits the President to:
[C]onfiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any
foreign [entity] that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in
such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest
in any property so confiscated shall vest ... in such agency or person as the
President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions
as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used,
administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States ....
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981), the President's ability to block assets is an important mode of
carrying out foreign policy objectives.
99. This provision was codified in section 117 ofthe Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998) (codified
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1610). The provision represented a significant departure from traditional
foreign sovereign immunity law in the United States and internationally-both legal systems have
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However, these provisions would not stand for long. The OCESA also
00
permitted the President to expressly override the attachment of property. 1
President Clinton swiftly executed a blanket waiver, thereby removing any
0
opportunity to attach blocked assets or diplomatic and consular property. 1 1
The OCESA was later revised to exempt diplomatic and consular
property ,' 2 as well as property involved in transactions awaiting final
determination by the federal government.0 3 As the following section
reveals, the struggle continued in subsequent legislative efforts to achieve
the congressional goal of developing more efficient judgment enforcements against state sponsors of terrorism.
D. Victims of Trafficking and Violence ProtectionAct of 2000
Congress intended the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000"04 (VTVPA) to apply to specific plaintiffs who sought
judgments against the nations of Cuba and Iran that were otherwise
unenforceable against frozen assets due to President Clinton's waiver of

consistently granted express immunity for diplomatic and consular property. For a thorough
discussion of the domestic and international laws that carve out special protection for diplomatic
and consular property, see Flatowv. Islamic Republic ofIran, 305 F.3d 1249, 1252 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (referencing the "Statement of Interest of the United States"). Specifically, the government
identified three authorities for its position in the Flatow case that diplomatic and consular property
should not be attached: 1) The Foreign Missions Act (FMA) expressly precludes the attachment of
such properties; 2) The FSIA provides a general source of immunity that can be penetrated only
through a specific exception, and no such exception has been made in the case of property used for
diplomatic purposes; 3) The United States is required to protect diplomatic and consular property
under the terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(d) permits the President to exercise a waiver in order to advance
other foreign relations goals or protect domestic security.
101. See Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998) (stating
that the President excercised the waiver primarily in the interest of national security and foreign
diplomatic relations); see also Bill Miller, Terrorism Victims Set Precedent: US. to PayDamages,
Collectfrom Iran, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at Al. The President's ability to waive § 1610(t)
in the national interest was once again articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3). See infra Part III.D
(explaining the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act). However, after President
Clinton exercised the waiver according to the clearer legislative directive, subsequent legislation
defined additional opportunities for plaintiffs to collect against foreign governments. See
Presidential Determination 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28,2000); see also Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337-40 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
102. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
103. Id. The exclusion applies to property that "is subject to a license issued by the United
States government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or to a person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of such
license has been specifically required by statute." Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
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the OCESA. °5 The statute permitted these individuals either to obtain an
amount equal to the value of their compensatory damages award from the
United States Treasury Department in exchange for a relinquishment of
claims for punitive damages or to seek fulfillment of compensatory and
punitive damages from the attachment of any property belonging to the
defendant nation and subject to blocking statutes."06 Immediately upon
signing the VTVPA into law, President Clinton issued a blanket waiver to
protect diplomatic and consular property as well as blocked assets." 7
105. Id. § 2002. The law applied only to plaintiffs who already held a final judgment against
Iran or Cuba or who already had initiated a lawsuit against either nation on one of five dates listed
within the statute. See id.; Sean D. Murphy, ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating
to InternationalLaw, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 132, 138 (2001). The law was intended to satisfy the
judgments of plaintiffs in cases already decided under the laws discussed in prior sections. See id.
106. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 § 2002. This is a
simplified summary of what are actually three choices:
First, [plaintiffs] may obtain from the Treasury Department 110 percent of the
compensatory damages awarded in their judgments, plus interest, if they relinquish all rights to compensatory and punitive damages awarded by U.S. courts.
Second, they may obtain from the Treasury Department 100 percent of the compensatory damages awarded in their judgments, plus interest, if they relinquish (a)
all rights to compensatory damages awarded by U.S. courts and (b) all rights to
execute against or attach certain categories of properties, including property that
is at issue in claims against the United States before an international tribunal.
Murphy, supra note 105, at 138 (footnotes omitted). The enactment also emerged from a much
more narrowly construed legislative interest. As the preamble declares, the VTVPA was intended
to deter international trafficking of persons for prostitution, slavery, and other forms of involuntary
servitude. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.
107. See Determination to Waive Attachment Provisions Relating to Blocked Property of
Terrorist-List States, Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).
This move rendered ineffectual the Act's provisions authorizing plaintiffs to collect punitive
damages. The waiver, executed on November 6, 2000, declared:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, including [the VTVPA], I hereby determine that subsection (f)(i). .. which provides that any property [seized under United States
blocking statutes] be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any
judgment relating to a claim for which a foreign state claiming such property is
not immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the States
[under the FSIA], would impede the ability of the President to conduct foreign
policy in the interest of national security and would, in particular, impede the
effectiveness of [the blocking statutes]. Therefore... I hereby waive subsection
(f)(I) of section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, in the interest of national
security.
Id. Despite this waiver, however, the executive branch did permit the release of blocked Cuban
assets to satisfy the claims arising out of Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.
Fla. 1997). See Taylor, supra note 17, at 541.
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Without these options, plaintiffs were left with only the opportunity to
collect compensatory damages from the United States Treasury Department. 08
E. TerrorismRisk InsuranceAct of 2002
The TRIA' 0 9 is the culmination of legislative effort to deter global
terrorism and facilitate collection of monetary judgments against foreign
governments. "0 Title II of the TRIA is a near replica of the previously
waived provisions of the OCESA. "' However, the newer version applies
to all future plaintiffs bringing suit against state sponsors of terrorism
and specifically limits the presidential waiver option." 2 The TRIA
requires the President to perform an "asset-by-asset" appraisal before
issuing any waiver and also voids all previous blanket waivers."3
Additionally, the statute authorizes the President to waive enforcement
only against certain types of diplomatic property, so that most blocked
assets remain within plaintiffs' reach." 4 The TRIA thus marked the end of
108. The Treasury Department paid approximately $350 million to satisfy claims in nine out
often suits against Iran. Taylor, supra note 17, at 541; Neely Tucker, DamagesAwarded to Terror
Victim's Family, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2002, at A26. However, even recipients considered the
source of these payments controversial. See Sean K. Mangan, Note, Compensationfor "Certain"
Victims of Terrorism UnderSection 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence ProtectionAct
of 2000: IndividualPaymentsat an InstitutionalCost,42 VA. J. INT'LL. 1037, 1058 (2002) ("Susan
Cohen, an active victims' rights advocate whose daughter died in the crash of Pan Am Flight 103
[stated] 'I'm no saint, but I could not take money this way.... It doesn't punish terrorists, it
punishes U.S. taxpayers.').
109. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
110. See supra Parts III.C-D.
111. CompareTerrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201, with Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-491. Indeed, the name of the TRIA section reflects the purposes of the OCESA: "Satisfaction
of Judgments from Blocked Assets of Terrorists, Terrorist Organizations, and State Sponsors of
Terrorism." Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201.
112. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 201(a)-(b)(2)(B).
113. See id. The legislation provides, in pertinent part:
[U]pon determining on an asset-by-asset basis that a waiver is necessary in the
national security interest, the President may waive the requirements of subsection
(a) in connection with (and prior to the enforcement of) any judicial order
directing attachment in aid of execution or execution against any property subject
to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.
Id. § 201(b)(1).
114. Id. Specifically, the statute excludes property subject to the Vienna Convention. Id. In
part, that Agreement requires the United States to protect the premises of diplomatic and consular
missions, as well as any other property contained therein. See id.
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a long and often turbulent battle to develop laws that would enable
Americans to sue and enforce judgments against foreign governments.
Throughout these legislative labors, the underlying goal has remained
remarkably unchanged. Congress has sought to deter state-supported
violence against Americans and permit plaintiffs to obtain restitution.
IV. APPLICABLE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

As Part I revealed, the TRIA and the Hague Convention directly clash
in the case of the biplane, creating what is essentially an intrajurisdictional
conflict-of-laws question." 5 Traditionally, one resolves conflicts between
laws of the same sovereign government through application of the canons
of construction." 6 The canons provide rules of interpretation and direct
courts to prioritize laws in a certain manner. 1 7 Often, the canons provide
clear outcomes, so that laws8 can be applied logically and consistently
despite facial disagreement.' 1
Despite their utility, contemporary courts regularly ignore the canons" 9
and view them as antiquated rules that have little use in today's postmodem, standards-based jurisprudence. 20 In many cases, the canons are

115. Gordonv. New York Stock Exchange,Inc. provides a good example of intrajurisdictional
conflict of law. 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (addressing a conflict between the Sherman Antitrust Act and
the Securities Exchange Act); see also Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473
U.S. 1 (1985) (addressing a conflict between two laws ofCongress, Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure
69 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
116. 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 168 (2004) provides a thorough overview ofthe ways in which
canons of construction may be used to reconcile conflicts by two laws passed by the same governmental entity.
117. See infra Part IV.B (discussing, inter alia,canons of construction based on timing of the
conflicting laws and the type of law).
118. For example, one rule of construction declares that when two laws conflict, the more
specific should govern the more general. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657
(1997). Since this canon is relatively easy to apply, outcomes can often be predicted based on this
rule.
119. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 207 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that the majority failed to apply the applicable CharmingBetsy doctrine when
resolving a conflict between a treaty and a statute); Kathleen M. O'Sullivan, Note, What Would
John MarshallSay? Does the FederalTrust ResponsibilityProtectTribal GamblingRevenue?, 84
GEO. L.J. 123, 138 (1995) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court "ignored the general
rules of statutory construction" when it decided UnitedStates v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)).
120. See, e.g., Eric S. Lasky, Note, PerplexingProblems with PlainMeaning,27 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 891,914 (1999) ("[T]he plain meaning rule [when classified as a canon of construction] has
been used by judges to justify judicial decisions, instead of facing complex or controversial social
or policy issues."). Lasky further provides an excellent summary of another work reaching a similar
conclusion:
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller pose the hypothetical of ajudge
who could decide a case one way by invoking the canons of statutory construction
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also self-contradicting because competing canons often apply to the same
case or controversy. 2 ' With regard to conflicts between treaties and
statutes, the use of canons has been criticized as a covert means by which
judges vastly impact foreign relations. '2-2 Some strict canons can lead
courts swiftly to dismiss important international agreements, 23 while
others can guide courts to overstep judicial powers by granting
unwarranted supremacy to international laws. 2 4 As the following sections
reveal, these criticisms become even more apparent when we apply the
canons in the case of the biplane.

or the plain meaning rule, or another way by invoking a public policy rationale.
Macey and Miller further hypothesize that societal wealth and human flourishing
would increase dramatically if the decision were made on the basis of public
policy, but would diminish just as dramatically if the canons of construction or the
plain meaning rule were invoked.
Id.(discussing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons ofStatutory Construction and
Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 649-56 (1992)) (footnotes omitted).
121. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation ofPowers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role ofInternational Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 505 (1998) ("'[There are two opposing
canons on almost every point."' (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
401 (1950))). In addition:
critics claim that canons do not provide any meaningful restraint on judicial
decisionmaking. Because of the existence of counter-canons and the selective use
of canons by judges, critics argue that canons "are useful only as facades, which
for an occasional judge may add lustre to an argument persuasive for other
reasons."
Id. (quoting FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY, LEGISLATION-CASES AND MATERIALS

654 (1955)).
122. See infra note 123.
123. For instance, the rule of subsequent acts of Congress would lead a court to dismiss an
international treaty because of an expressly inconsistent domestic statute.
124. For a criticism of one rule of construction, the Charming Betsy doctrine, as a means by
which international law is able to trump domestic enactments, see Bradley, supra note 12 1, at 483.
Bradley notes:
This indirect, "phantom" use of international law can, in some cases, have the
same effect as direct incorporation of international law. Indeed, it is arguable that,
"when actual congressional intent is ambiguous or absent," applying the
Charming Betsy canon "is the same as creating a rule that the government
regulatory scheme cannot violate international law."
Id. (footnote omitted).
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A. The Rule of Liberal Constructionof InternationalTreaties
The United States Constitution declares that all treaties made by the
United States should be considered the "supreme law of the land."'25 This
broad deference to foreign relations resolutions is also reflected in rules
governing the interpretation of treaties. The United States Supreme Court
consistently has upheld Justice Story's liberal rule of construction: "[i]fthe
treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other
liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights; ... the
most liberal exposition [should] be adopted."' 26 When applying a treaty's
provisions to a fact pattern, courts should be mindful of the objectives that
precipitated the agreement and advance an interpretation that preserves
equality and reciprocity between contracting nations."2 7 Since treaties are
essentially "contracts between independent nations, . . . words are to be
taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations,
and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local law,
unless such restricted sense is clearly intended."' 2 Additionally, courts
should clarify any ambiguities with reference to the parties' conduct after
ratification of the agreement.129 Therefore, courts should identify the
broader intent of the parties, as demonstrated by the language of the
agreement and the parties' successive conduct, and yield to the
interpretation that broadens, rather than restricts, the underlying goals that
the agreement seeks to advance. 30

125. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2; see also Filanto, S.p.A.v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp.
1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that "the Arbitration Convention... is the supreme law
of the land... and controls any case in any American court falling within its sphere of application"
(citation omitted)).
126. Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. 242, 249 (1830); see also Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123,
128-29 (1928) (interpreting a treaty liberally, so that "trade" or "commerce" also would include
operation of ahospital); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 343 (1924) (interpreting a treaty
liberally so that pawnbrokers are included in the definition of "trade"); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483, 487 (1879) (asserting that the rule adopted in Shanks was the fundamental rule of
construction for treaties signed by the United States).
127. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
128. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 325
(1987) (stating, "[an international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose").
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 325. That section
provides: "Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
agreement, and subsequentpractice between the parties in the application of the agreement, are to
be taken into account in its interpretation." Id. (emphasis added).
130. The Court explained in BarcardiCorp. ofAmerica v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163
(1940):
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A court applying these principles in the case of the biplane could
construe the Hague Convention's guarantee that "[Contracting States] shall
without delay return the [unlawfully seized] aircraft and its cargo to the
persons lawfully entitled to possession"'1 31 to mean that participating
nations agreed that when an aircraft is brought to foreign territory as a
result of an unlawful seizure, the host nation should exercise dominion and
control over the aircraft only for the purpose of returning it to its nation of
origin. 32 Such an interpretation likely would advance the important
interest of reciprocity. 33 Since domestic laws can change over time and
from one nation to the next, the Hague Convention would be far more
complex if taken to mean that states should return aircraft unless domestic
laws require some other proceeding or disposition. Since the Hague
Convention and its predecessor treaties exemplify a global intent to grant
civil aircraft a protected status that does not hinge on political relations
between nations, any reading that places aircraft at the mercy of local laws
and courts clearly would defeat this intent.
Additionally, the phrase "persons lawfully entitled to possession"'34
could be construed according to the probable meaning assigned by nations
at the time of signing; the Chicago and Geneva Conventions clearly
establish that the international community intended to protect the
registeredforeign owners of aircraft, and not simply "aircraft owners" in
some abstract, ever-changing sense. 35 In contrast, an interpretation that
defines this phrase based on domestic laws that enable a plaintiff to attach
and enforce a judgment against any property belonging to the defendant
foreign government would be a flagrant violation of the rule against
defining terms in an "artificial or special sense impressed ... by local
laws."' 36 Indeed, at the time of the biplane's arrival in the United States,
the local law enabling Martinez to enforce her judgment against the

According to the accepted canon, we should construe the treaty liberally to give
effect to the purpose which animates it. Even where a provision of a treaty fairly
admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging, rights which may
be claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred.
(citing Jordan,278 U.S. 123). Courts also should make every attempt to advance the underlying
purpose of the treaty because it reflects the intentions of such "high contracting parties." Sullivan
v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921).
131. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
132. The promise to return aircraft "without delay" can be read to indicate that no judicial
process, however summary, will be required or even permitted prior to release of the aircraft.
133. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
134. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.
136. See De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890).
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aircraft was not even in force.' Finally, courts could resolve any remaining ambiguity through review of the parties' course of conduct with
respect to the Hague Convention's mandate. Since the United States and
Cuba, as well as all other signatory nations, consistently have abided by
the agreement and returned aircraft without hesitation,' any argument for
ambiguity seems to have little merit.
In summary, the rules governing interpretation of treaties suggest that
the only legitimate reading of the Hague Convention is one that discounts
Martinez's rights under the TRIA. The next question is whether the subsequent passage of the TRIA overruled the terms of the Hague Convention.
B. The "Last-in-Time " Principleand the Charming Betsy Doctrine
Although treaties are supreme law, subsequent federal statutes may
overrule a treaty. This is because acts of Congress and international
treaties are considered to be of equal importance.' 39 In Whitney v.
Robertson, 4 ' the United States Supreme Court enunciated the "last-intime" principle: when a successive statute is expressly inconsistent with
a treaty, the statute overrules the treaty. 4 ' for domestic purposes4 2 wherever they are in conflict.4 3 When the statute does not expressly overrule

137. CNN WolfBlitzer Reports, supra note 11.
138. Id.
139. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("[A] treaty is placed on the same
footing... with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law
of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other."); see also Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (reaffirming the Whitney rule).
140. 124 U.S. 190.
141. Id. at 194; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,600 (1889) (holding
that a treaty "can be deemed... only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified
at the pleasure of Congress. In any case the last expression of the sovereign will must control");
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616,621 (1870)
("The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not settled by the Constitution.
But [there is no] doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and
an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty." (footnote omitted)).
142. James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, Section IV: The Status in United States Law
ofSecurity CouncilResolutions Under ChapterVII ofthe UnitedNations Charter,46 AM. J.CoMP.
L. 421,425 (1998) (explaining that the treaty is still valid internationally and that the United States
still would be bound by its terms in the international arena).
143. Id.; see also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (stating that when a federal statute expressly
conflicts with an international treaty, "the one last in date will control the other"). There are
numerous arguments to support continued application of this canon of construction:
[Tihe first of three reasons usually given for the later-in-time rule interprets [the
notion of equality between the three branches of government] to mean that the
latest sovereign act should govern. Proponents of the second reason see no
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the treaty,"a additional rules of construction apply. According to Whitney,
when a treaty and an act of Congress relate to the same subject without
containing express language of repeal, courts should "endeavor to construe
them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the
language of either."' 45 If the two cannot be reconciled so as to give effect
to both, then courts historically have interpreted specific provisions of the
conflicting statute and treaty according to the Charming Betsy doctrine,
which declares that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."' 46
Therefore, in recognition of a presumption that Congress typically does
not intend to overrule international treaties, 147 statutes must yield to treaties
justification for preferring an act in which only two parties-the president and the
Senate-cooperate over one in which the House of Representatives also, participates. Those who advance the third reason argue that interference by the courts
would impede the proper functioning of the political branches in foreign affairs.
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'LL.
313, 313-14 (2001).
144. The term "expressly," as a qualifier, is based on other language used in Whitney,
subsequent case law, and other corollary canons of construction. See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 195
("[W]hen a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for want
of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that
character belong to another department of the government."); see also Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank,
296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and
manifest...."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (holding that before determining that a treaty or a statute has overruled the other, courts
"must examine the language of the statute and of the treaty to determine whether there is 'a positive
repugnancy' between them, which renders them irreconcilable. Second, [courts] must examine the
legislative history of the Treaty to determine whether there is 'some affirmative showing of an
intention to repeal"' (citations omitted)), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 319, 323-24 (3d. Cir. 1983).
145. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (holding further, "if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date
will control the other"); see also Kelly v. Hedden, 124 U.S. 196 (1888) (asserting that the rule of
Whitney normally would apply, but it was not necessary to resolve the case because the challenged
statute contained a clause providing that it should not be interpreted to violate any treaty of the
United States).
146. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
147. This possible justification for the rule of construction is discussed in Bradley, supranote
121, at 495-97 ("Congress generally does not wish to violate international law because, among
other things, such violations might . . . create foreign relations difficulties for the United
States. . . . [O]ne could argue that Congress has been on notice that if it intends to violate
international law, it must make that intent clear."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHEFOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OFTHE U.S. § 115 cmt. a (1987) ("It is generally assumed that Congress does not
intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United States by nullifying a rule of
international law or an international agreement as domestic law .... "). But see Vagts, supra note
143, at 319 (discussing Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which the court looked
to legislative intent and determined that Congress intended that the Byrd Amendment would cause
the United States to violate international agreements).
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48

when no other reconciliation is possible.
The first question to be determined in the case of the biplane is whether
a successive statute that provides a right to enforce judgments against a
wide range of assets belonging to certain defendant foreign governments
should be interpreted to overrule the Hague Convention's guarantee that
"[Contracting States will] without delay return the [unlawfully seized]
aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession."' 49 A
court may find that the TRIA has overruled the Hague Convention. Since
the TRIA does not provide a catalog of property to which it may be
applied, its reach is limited only by the specific exclusions contained
therein. Most notably, the statute declares that plaintiffs may not attach
diplomatic or consular property. 50 A court may conclude that Congress
did not intend to uphold the provisions of the Hague Convention, since
despite significant deliberation over the protection of diplomatic and
consular property during the initial passage of, and subsequent revisions
to, the OCESA, the VPVTA, and the TRIA, it did not similarly exclude
protected aircraft in the final draft of the TRIA. 5 ' In fact, Congress's
148. See The Schooner CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (holding that "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains"); see
also United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that "courts will not
blind themselves to potential violations of international law where legislative intent is ambiguous");
United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining that only "the clearest of
expressions on the part of Congress" should be found to overcome the Charming Betsy doctrine);
Peters v. McKay, 238 P.2d 225, 231 (Or. 1951) ("[I]n construing a statute, [courts] will indulge a
strong presumption that the legislature did not intend to violate international law and will read into
a statute such qualification or exceptions as may be necessary to avoid apparent conflict." Courts
will apply this presumption "unless it unmistakably appears that a statute was intended to be in
disregard of a principle or international law."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S. § 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United
States.").
149. Hague Convention, supra note 8, at art. 9, para. 2.
150. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322,
2337-40 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
151. The legislative history, including frequent battles regarding the exclusion of diplomatic
and consular property, perhaps demonstrates a congressional intent to create a broad statute that
would reach property normally protected by international agreements. See supra Part Ill.
Congress's repeated attempts to reinsert diplomatic and consular property demonstrates this intent,
and one could argue that Congress finally agreed to exempt such diplomatic and consular property
only in order to pass the legislation. These arguments could demonstrate intent to overrule, since
courts have found that even where the act of Congress does not expressly overrule the provisions
of a treaty, other evidence of a manifest intent to overrule the international obligation may be
sufficient evidence of an overruling. See, e.g., Kappus v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 337 F.3d
1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that even though a statute did not contain any mention of a
treaty, and therefore did not expressly overrule it, Congress passed subsequent legislation that
indicated a broad intent to give priority to statutes relating to revenue collection); S. African
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attempts through prior legislation to enable plaintiffs to reach property
normally protected by international agreements may evince intent to
provide plaintiffs a virtually limitless ability to obtain compensation." 2 A
court adopting this argument would conclude that the TRIA circumscribed
the protections afforded by the Hague Convention, so that the treaty would
not protect aircraft owned by defendant nations.
On the other hand, a court could find that the TRIA did not overrule the
Hague Convention because, unlike statutes typically construed to repeal
treaties, 153 the TRIA does not contain any express mention of the Hague
Convention or that treaty's very precise subject matter. Indeed, the
subsequent statute is so broad, and the treaty so narrow,' 54 that a court
easily could find that Congress did not intend to overrule the Hague
Convention, but rather neglected even to consider application of the TRIA
to unlawfully seized aircraft.' 55 If a court adopts this position, not only
would the statute fail to meet Whitney's requirement of an express
overruling, but the additional, corollary canon of construction disfavoring
a court from finding that the
implicit overrulings would further prevent
1 56
Convention.
Hague
the
overruled
TRIA

Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (looking to the legislative history of a statute
to determine whether overruling was intended and finding that "there is no indication in the
legislative history to suggest that in adopting the Anti-Apartheid Act as amended, Congress
intended to abrogate any provision of the Agreement").
152. See supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). In Breard,the Court found that
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,
which provides that a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in violation of
"treaties of the United States" will, as a general rule, not be afforded an
evidentiary hearing if he "has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in
State court proceedings." [Thus, the AEDPA modifies] Breard's ability to obtain
relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention [.J
Id. (citations omitted).
154. Indeed, even this difference between the two laws could awaken another canon of
construction that would yield a similar answer. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51
(1974) ("Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment.").
155. It is not unusual for courts to surmise that legislators simply failed to consider the
interplay between new laws and those currently in operation. See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474,
479 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that "[tlhe legislators who enacted section 1988 would not have wanted
its effectiveness blunted because of a little known rule of court promulgated almost 40 years
earlier"), rev'd, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (overruling the lower court, but impliedly recognizing that there
are situations where legislatures fail to consider the ramifications of their actions).
156. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984)
(identifying "a firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of
a treaty in ambiguous congressional action"); see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120
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If a court determines that the TRIA has not overruled the Hague
Convention, the next inquiry would focus on possible reconciliation of the
conflicting laws. First, the TRIA and the Hague Convention broach the
same subject matter, so that a court should attempt to interpret each in a
manner that leaves the other intact.'57 Specifically, the TRIA and the
Hague Convention reflect a desire to deter acts of international violence.
Since the TRIA enables plaintiffs to reach a broad range ofproperty, 158and
since the Hague Convention only protects civil aircraft that have been
brought to another nation by acts of air piracy, 5 9 the two laws easily could
co-exist. For example, a plaintiff would retain a broad right of enforcement
under the TRIA, but the Hague Convention would exclude protected
aircraft. 6 ° On the other hand, a court just as easily could find that the two
laws do not broach the same subject matter: the Hague Convention
governs aircraft hijackings, whereas the TRIA concerns the enforcement
of domestic judgments. 6 ' A court adopting this latter approach would not2
be bound to interpret the two laws in a mutually protective manner. 16
However, the court nonetheless should reach the same result in this case
through application of the CharmingBetsy doctrine, which directs courts
to handle irreconcilable inconsistencies between a statute and a treaty by
interpreting the statute in a manner that does not offend the treaty. 6 3 As in
the preceding example, the TRIA would continue to permit plaintiffs to
enforce judgments against a wide range of property, but aircraft protected
by the Hague Convention would remain beyond reach.
Although this analysis seems straightforward enough, there is
significant potential for varying outcomes. Since the canons are not driven

(1933) ("A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless
such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."); Chew Heong v. United States,
112 U.S. 536, 550 (1884) (finding that absent any express language of repeal, a subsequent
legislative enactment is presumed to have been passed with knowledge that the treaty would
nonetheless circumvent the statute in cases pertaining to the same subject matter). This is also
consistent with more general canons of construction which disfavor implied rescissions of laws.
See, e.g., United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) (citing the "cardinal
principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored").
157. Such a reading would be consistent with the rule articulated in Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
158. See supra Part III.E.
159. See Hague Convention, supra note 8, Preamble.
160. Consider, for example, the case ofthe biplane. Even ifMartinez had been prevented from
attaching the biplane, she still would be able to enforce her judgment against other blocked
property. The biplane, with its estimated worth of thirty to forty thousand dollars, is not critical to
her right to receive compensation.
161. See supra Parts Il-Ill.
162. This is because the Whitney rule requires only that courts apply a statute and treaty in a
mutually protective manner when the two relate to the same subject. See supra notes 139, 143.
163. See supra note 148.
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by a review of policy or legislative interests, the divergent outcomes occur
when courts decline to apply a certain canon. For example, courts
occasionally ignore the CharmingBetsy doctrine. 64 A court declining to
apply that canon most likely would revert back to the last-in-time principle
in the face of an irreconcilable conflict between a statute and a treaty. 65
The last-in-time principle would direct a court to apply the TRIA's
provisions to the case at the expense of the Hague Convention, since the
TRIA is the more recent enactment. While both laws would remain in
force, the TRIA's broad provisions would render the Hague Convention
powerless in the case of the biplane.
In summary, the canons of construction do not categorically resolve the
matter. Although the canons are strict rules, different applications lead to
varying outcomes, and failure to apply any one canon can transform the
analysis.166 Since the canons do not consider legislative interests or policy
arguments, the analysis can appear quite mechanical. However, this does
not mean courts lack discretion. In the case of the biplane, courts are left
with ample opportunity to find that the TRIA overruled the Hague
Convention or that the two laws must be reconciled so that both remain
effective. Even when a court seeks to reconcile the two laws, varying
results are still possible. Courts could apply the CharmingBetsy doctrine
to favor the treaty's provisions and the "last-in-time" principle to favor the
statute's provisions.'67 At each juncture, judges can peer ahead at
numerous outcomes, choose the one that appears the most fair, and then
write an analysis that applies those canons that lead to the chosen end.'68
In recognition of this large amount of judicial discretion, scholars have
argued that the so-called "strict" canons of construction do not make the
ultimate determination any less discretionary for courts, and the actual
means by which courts resolve intrajurisdictional conflict of laws questions actually may resemble the interest analysis approach to interstate
conflicts-albeit performed in a covert, unpublicized manner.'69 The

164. See supra note 119.
165. See supra note 141.
166. For example, a court could decline to apply the Charming Betsy doctrine and instead
simply use the "last-in-time" principle. In that case, the TRIA would be interpreted to overrule the
Hague Convention, even though the Charming Betsy doctrine would have forced the court to
construe the TRIA in a manner that leaves the treaty intact.
167. It is unclear which of these paths the trial court adopted in the actual case of the biplane,
since no written opinion is available. There is always a chance that the canons were ignored or that
the court simply applied the "last-in-time" principle and adopted the TRIA.
168. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 119, at 138 (asserting that the United States Supreme
Court "ignored the general rules of statutory construction" when it decided United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), in order to reach a preferred conclusion).
169. CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 119-20 (David P. Currie et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2001). At the beginning of a chapter introducing the interest analysis approach to conflicts,
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following section provides an introduction to the modem interest analysis
paradigm and explores whether an overt application of interest analysis
would enable courts to resolve cases in a more predictable manner. 7 '
V. THE MODERN INTEREST ANALYSIS PARADIGM

Interest analysis, developed by Professor Brainerd Currie, 7 ' begins
with a supposition that every law is designed to advance certain societal
purposes. 7 2 Despite the logic inherent in this realism, traditional conflicts
paradigms often failed to advance legislative goals.'73 Like the canons of
construction, traditional choice-of-law approaches favored strict rules that
174
often neglected to take into account deeper interests of the states.
Moreover, just as courts sometimes ignore canons of construction in order
to reach more favorable outcomes, so-called "escape devices' ' 75 steadily
the text presents Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983), and the reversal opinion in Marek
v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985). Both opinions address a conflict between two laws of Congress,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 1; Chesny, 720
F.2d at 474. The opinions ofthe Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals and United States Supreme Court
demonstrate the use of what appears to be an interest analysis to resolve an intrajurisdictional
conflict, even though interest analysis is supposedly only an approach to interstate conflicts
questions. See CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS, supra, at 120-2 1. In the notes
following the cases, the editors cite numerous other cases that address conflicts between two laws
of the same sovereign and conclude that interest analysis seems to be the actual manner by which
courts always resolve intrajurisdictional choice of law questions. See id.A similar argument is
made in Michael Traynor, Conflict ofLaws: ProfessorCurrie'sRestrainedandEnlightenedForum,
49 CAL. L. REv. 845, 852-53 (1961) (asserting that courts often weigh competing interests to
resolve intrajurisdictional conflict of laws).
170. The importation of conflicts analyses, and more specifically, interest analysis, into other
areas of law is not an idea that is novel to this Note. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie
DoctrineRevisited: How a Conflicts PerspectiveCan Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1235 (1999) (considering whether this approach could be applicable to the Erie analysis in Civil
Procedure).
171. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts:A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. Cam L. REV. 227 (1958).
172. See id.This is inherent in Currie's analysis; throughout the article, he suggests that states
have important interests which are advanced when specific laws of that state are advanced.
173. The traditional approach is exemplified in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§ 119-428 (1934). The myriad rules can be summarized as offering a few single-contact
rules for selecting the jurisdiction whose law should apply. For instance, in contracts cases, courts
using the Restatement (First)of Conflict ofLaws would be called upon to apply the law ofthe place
where the contract was made. See id.
174. See Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles:
ParadigmShift or Pandora'sBox?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 867, 879-81 (2001) (providing
a detailed history and summary of traditional conflicts laws).
175. This term is used in a section heading in the text of CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS supra note 169, at 38. The section, "Traditional Practice: A Survey of
Escape Devices" addresses the various methods by which courts began to stray from the traditional
rules in order to reach judicial outcomes that advanced the interests of justice and public policy.
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eroded the traditional approaches to choice-of-law questions, so that the
ultimate virtue of the strict rules-predictability-stood on shaky
ground. 176 More importantly, Currie found that strict approaches often
resulted in undesirable or perverse outcomes. 17 Strict rules may dictate
application of one state's law to a case in which the state has no real
interest, at the expense of another state whose interests in having its law
apply are overwhelming. 78 Such perverse outcomes are clearly possible
when courts analyze intrajurisdictional conflict-of-laws questions under
the canons of construction: the application of strict rules in the case of the
biplane would lead a court to apply the TRIA to enforce a plaintiff's
judgment against property of relatively little value, 179 while simultaneously
placing a critically important international treaty on shaky ground. In light
of the legislative history and governmental interests driving both laws, 8 °
such an outcome is far from ideal.
Currie, focusing his attention on interstate choice-of-law questions,
sought to avoid these perverse outcomes under the strict rules by
proposing that courts determine whether application of the law to the
instant case advances each state's legislative interests.' 8 ' If both states'
interests are promoted, then there is a "true conflict."'' 82 To resolve true
conflicts, courts should reconsider the legislative purposes behind the
conflicting laws and determine whether a "more moderate and restrained
interpretation of the policy or interest of one state" would eradicate the

See id. Other scholars have noted that the escape devices offer courts an opportunity to reach the
desired outcome and then structure their analysis so that it would appear as though mechanical laws
guided the decision. See id. at 47 (discussing R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OFCONFLICT OF LAWS 95 (1962)
(describing various Arkansas cases in which the courts, called upon to apply traditional rules that
hinge on whether the case is a tort or contract, apparently "chos[e] whichever characterization was
necessary for the occasion")).
176. See id. at 47 (questioning whether the widespread use of escape devices will threaten
uniformity and predictability).
177. Currie, supra note 171, at 242. For instance, one classic territorial rule used to resolve
interstate choice-of-law questions declared that the law of the place where the contract was formed
should govern the case. Id. at 245. However, Currie found that this rule produced desirable results
in only six of fourteen hypothetical cases. See id. at 242. In four of these six cases, the states'
interests do not conflict, and in the remaining two cases the forum state's interests are advanced,
and the foreign state's interests are subjugated. Id.
178. See id.
179. See supranote 2 (estimating the biplane's probable economic value).
180. See supra Parts II-III
(discussing the interests and purposes behind the Hague
Convention, its predecessor treaties, the TRIA, and its predecessor statutes).
181. See Currie, supra note 171, at 242, 246.
182. See id. at 253. Currie also acknowledged that there may be "false conflicts," or cases in
which only one state has a genuine interest in having its law apply. See id. at 252. In such cases,
Currie's model instructs courts to apply the law of the only state with an interest. Id.

2005]

CONFLICTING PROVISIONS IN FEDERAL STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

123

conflict. 8 3 The following section carefully considers the policies behind
the two laws that clash in the case of the biplane.
A. Policies Underlying the Conflicting Substantive Laws
On the surface, both the Hague Convention and the TRIA are designed
to deter global terrorism; the TRIA facilitates the enforcement of
judgments against state sponsors of terrorism, while the Hague Convention
establishes an international procedure for handling incidents of air
piracy. 84 Yet the detailed histories of these laws, including relevant
predecessor laws, reveal more distinct and potentially divergent legislative
purposes. The Hague Convention reflects the global community's need to
protect foreign ownership interests in aircraft forced to land in unfriendly
territory. 8 To this end, the Hague Convention embodies an intent to
remove civil aircraft from the political whim of participating nations and
combat and deter air piracy by establishing a systematic and cooperative
procedure for handling such incidents. 186 Applying the Hague Convention
to the case of the biplane clearly advances the interests behind that
its owner
agreement; the biplane is an "unlawfully seized"
87 aircraft, and
returned.
not
is
aircraft
the
will suffer a loss if
The TRIA also represents important legislative goals. Congress passed
the statute to enable plaintiffs to sue and collect judgments against nations
that have caused death or injury to Americans. 88 Congress designed the
TRIA, like its thwarted predecessors, to deter acts of terrorism and
compensate American victims. As prior legislative attempts reveal,
Congress also intended the law to target a virtually limitless range of
assets.' 89 The TRIA's goals are advanced when it is applied to the case of
the biplane. 9" Martinez has suffered an injury and should be made whole.

183. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflicts
of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963).
184. See supraParts II-HI (discussing the interests, purposes, and histories of these two laws).
185. In the years following World War II, a growing civil aviation industry required that
nations afford special treatment to commercial flights so that aviation, as well as all other
commercial endeavors that rely on air travel, could develop independent of political sentiments.
See supra Part II. These interests are reflected in the Chicago and Geneva Conventions, which
should be used to interpret the language of the Hague Convention. The latter treaty's protection of
the aircraft's "lawful owner," when considered in the context of the preceding treaties and the
historical interests they reflect, clearly indicates that states should respect the lawful foreign owner,
not a person lawfully entitled to possession and ownership as a result of domestic laws. See id.
186. See id.
187. Although the biplane is significantly less valuable than most aircraft, see supra note 2,
international agreements depend on consistent and uniform application.
188. See supra Part III.
189. This argument is presented in supra note 151.
190. However, a court also could find that the goals of the TRIA are not advanced by
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Although the biplane is of modest value,' 9 ' it is socio-economically more
efficient to enable Martinez to receive some rapid relief. Because the
process of seizing an item of personal property is likely easier than that of
lobbying the federal government to release blocked liquid assets,' 92 the
biplane is an efficient mode of compensation. Therefore, since the interests
behind both laws are advanced when applied to the case of the biplane, a
true conflict exists.
A more moderate or restrained reading of either law would not appear
to resolve the conflict. The Hague Convention depends on consistent and
uniform application, and the TRIA is rooted in a governmental intent to
provide victims restitution, with almost no limits on the type of property
plaintiffs may reach.
At this point in an interstateconflict, Currie would recommend that the
court simply apply the law of the forum; Currie argues that it would be
inappropriate for courts to balance the interests of two states in order to

application to the case of the biplane. The goal of deterrence is not truly advanced since the
biplane's worth is not financially significant to the Cuban government. Indeed, since the Cuban
government did not suffer a significant financial loss, and since the entire episode imposed upon
the biplane considerable symbolic value, the application of the TRIA can in fact lead to greater
hostilities between the two nations and potentially invite future acts of terrorism. This symbolic
value is reflected in President Fidel Castro's decision to stage a rally outside the American mission
in Havana in response to the biplane's attachment. See Cuba: Thousands Protest Against U.S.,
supra note 31. The United States has, at prior points in history, considered violations of
international law as potential invitations for acts of aggression from other nations. See Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("A treaty is primarily a compact between independent
nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it." If enforcement by this method fails, the breach of the treaty
"becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations,... which may in the end be
enforced by actual war."); Bradley, supra note 121, at 492 (explaining that, in early American
history, "[t]he possibility that breaches of international law could result in war ... had been a
significant concern during the drafting of the Constitution. Thus.... the U.S. government had a
strong desire to avoid violations of international law" (footnotes omitted)). Additionally, the
TRIA's goal of compensating American victims is not advanced by application of the TRIA to the
case of the biplane-Martinez's judgment of $27.1 million is nowhere near fulfilled, nor is she
likely to be made whole by the biplane. Therefore, although she obtained some recompense, she
most likely will have to enforce her judgment against other assets. If a court adopted this position,
the analysis would essentially end-the case would present a "false conflict," and the court would
apply the Hague Convention to the case of the biplane.
191. See supra note 2.
192. See Jennifer Valdes, Woman Takes on Castro:Cuban Agent MarriedHer, Then Left Her
Alone in West Kendall, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 5, 2003, at IA ("Obtaining access to the
[blocked] money could be difficult, however, unless [Martinez and her attorneys] successfully
lobby Congress and President Bush."). For some examples of the difficult questions that arise, see
Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, RecoveringFrozen TerroristAssets; Attorney Work Product,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 2003, at 3; Leigh Jones, Bomb Victim's Kin Cannot Tap IranianAssets in City
Bank, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 2004, at 1.
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make a choice. 91 3 Clearly, courts cannot resolve intrajurisdictional conflictof-laws questions through application of the forum law because both laws
are laws of the forum. However, criticism of Currie's approach clearly
demonstrates 94 that reliance on forum law to sidestep an inappropriate
exercise of judicial power is unnecessary in this case. Using interest
analysis to resolve an intrajurisdictional conflict of laws question does not
implicate Currie's concerns about interstate relations. In fact, courts
regularly weigh legislative interests within their own jurisdictions.'95
Therefore, when courts apply interest analysis in an intrajurisdictional
context, Currie's "restrained" approach is unnecessary.
B. A Fully "Unrestrained"Approach to Classic InterestAnalysis?
Since intrajurisdictional conflict of laws questions do not implicate
Currie's concerns, courts could resolve clashes between two laws of the
same sovereign simply by weighing competing interests in an unrestrained
manner. As numerous cases demonstrate, courts often do this when they
interpret and apply most laws created by the legislative body in their own
jurisdictions.' However, the case of the biplane, and indeed any case that
features a conflict between a statute and a treaty, raises other theoretical
concerns that perhaps necessitate some restraint on judicial discretion.
In the case of the biplane, a balancing of interests would require courts
to identify and advance interests that affect the sovereign's position
internationally; the analysis would be artificial if courts simply gave
mechanical deference to interests that occupy a domestic arena. 97 Thus,
193. Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 176 (1959) (explaining that any "assessment of the respective values of the competing
legitimate interests of two sovereign states ... is a political function of a very high order").
194. See, e.g., Traynor, supranote 169, at 852-53 (asserting that courts often weigh competing
interests to resolve intrajurisdictional conflicts of laws).
195. See, e.g., Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1983) (addressing a conflict between
two laws of Congress, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, by evaluating the
interests behind each).
196. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (considering the interests and
purposes behind two laws of the same jurisdiction, the intestacy statute on descent and distribution
and the criminal laws regarding murder, and finding that "slayers" should not be permitted to
inherit from the decedent-victim's estate).
197. For instance, a court that assumes a domestic frame of reference may find that it makes
better socio-economic sense to enable Martinez to obtain some rapid relief, even though the biplane
is of modest value. An American court certainly will be sensitive to the needs of an American
plaintiff injured by a foreign state. Also, since the process of seizing an item of personal property
is most likely easier than lobbying the federal government to release blocked liquid assets, the
better law may indeed be the TRIA in this instance. However, a court also could assume a broader
frame of reference, and find that an entire global civil aviation industry-including the American
corporations that dominate the market--depends on the promises made by the parties to the Hague
Convention. Given the importance of that industry to virtually all other business endeavors, it may
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courts must be willing to adopt a domestic and international frame of
reference. This simply is not the norm. Case law demonstrates that
American courts tend to discount the-needs of the global community when
faced with conflicts between domestic and international laws,' 98 so that an
unrestrained interest balancing typically would result in adoption of the
statute over the treaty. 99 Therefore, an unrestrained weighing of interests
may not be the best approach in the case of the biplane.
C. The ComparativeImpairmentApproach to InterestAnalysis
The comparative impairment approach to interest analysis, developed
by Professor William Baxter, 20 0 provides a variation of Currie's model that
may resolve the case of the biplane. This approach to interstate conflicts
urges courts to apply the law of the state whose interests would suffer the
most by application of another state's law.20 ' In this manner, courts can
further evaluate the competing interests and classify them in a more
predictable fashion, without going so far as to permit unrestrained,
normative weighing of interests.- °2
In the case of the biplane, application of the TRIA would significantly
impair the goals of the Hague Convention. Since international agreements
depend on consistent application by member states, 203 an alternative
disposition, even in a single case, can render the entire agreement obsolete.
Indeed, because international law is not governed by a single legislative
body that can rewrite and amend laws as circumstances change, 20 4 treaties

be more socio-economically sound to advance the Hague Convention at the expense of one person's
right to collect under the TRIA. In reaching this determination, a court may consider the financial
pressures that already have wreaked havoc on the airline industry as a result of September I1, as
well as the domestic and international community's need for cooperation to combat hijackings.
198. This argument was advanced in Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status ofAmerican Law
in the HagueJudgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1284-85 (1998). Zekoll cites
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Societe NationaleIndustrielle Aerospatialev. United
States DistrictCourt, 482 U.S. 522 (1987), which applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
a manner that violated the Hague Evidence Convention.
199. Zekoll, supra note 198, at 1284-85.
200. See William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42
(1963-1964).
201. See id. at 9.
202. A court using comparative impairment weighs the extent of the impairment of laws and
state interests, not the value or importance of the legislature's interest. See id at 5; see also
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720-21 (Cal. 1976) (applying comparative impairment,
thereby adopting the model as the dominant choice-of-law theory to resolve interstate conflicts).
203. Zekoll, supra note 198, at 1284 (explaining that international agreements depend on
consistent application but asserting that the United States has failed to recognize its obligations
under international law on several occasions).
204. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the US. raises this point
eloquently:
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gain international force when member states consistently follow them. 2°s
Since the United States and Cuba, as well as other participating nations,
always have followed the Hague Convention, it would be reasonable for
the Cuban government to expect that the treaty would continue to govern
acts of air piracy between the two nations.2" Indeed, all parties to the
Hague Convention have justified expectations2 7 that the agreement will
be upheld.0 8 Since the agreement, like its predecessor treaties, is
essentially a global contract designed to remove civil aircraft from the
political whims of potentially unfriendly nations, signatory nations most
likely expected that the special protections afforded to civil aircraft would
apply regardless of future hostilities. 2' No party could have anticipated

There is no "world government" as the term "government" is commonly
understood. There is no central legislature with general law-making authority; the
General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations influence the
development of international law but only when their product is accepted by
states. There is no executive institution to enforce law; the United Nations
Security Council has limited executive power to enforce the provisions of the
Charter and to maintain international peace and security, but it has no authority
to enforce international law generally ....
Introductory Note to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. (1987)
(citation omitted).
205. See supra note 203.
206. See supra notes 11, 27.
207. Professor William Joseph Singer explained the role ofthe parties' "justified expectations"
in a 1990 article:
Interest analysis focuses initially on (1) the policies underlying conflicting
substantive laws and on the persons or events toward which those policies are
directed. It then supplements this factor with consideration of (2) the justified
expectations of the parties who may have relied on the law of a particular state in
planning their conduct or who would be unfairly surprised by the application of
another state's law.
Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 733-34 (1990)
(footnotes omitted). When considering the justified expectations of the parties, the analysis should
discern whether application of either law would lead to "unfair surprise." Id. at 734 & n. 1i.
208. In fact, in international trade, contracting parties-including nations-often identify
specific international agreements or international law more generally as the governing law in
choice-of-law provisions. Fabrizio Marrella, Choice ofLaw in Third-MillenniumArbitrations: The
Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1137, 1142 (2003).
209. These expectations are reflected in the Chinese government's reaction to the overruling
of a treaty:
"[The court hearing the case] says that it can not inquire whether the reasons for
this action are good or bad, because... the will of Congress must be obeyed,
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that a subsequent State Department label identifying certain nations as
"state sponsors of terrorism" would modify or nullify the Hague
Convention."'°
Declining to apply the TRIA to the case of the biplane, however, would
not significantly impair the interests behind the statute. Since the TRIA
explicitly permits the President to conduct an "asset-by-asset"
determination,2"' the law's interests do not depend on attachment of
property in every instance. If a plaintiff cannot execute his judgment
against a certain asset, he is still free to pursue enforcement against other
property.
Martinez's justified expectations do not change the outcome. Martinez
certainly expected to enforce her judgment against property belonging to
the Cuban government. The question, however, is whether her
expectations were reasonable with regard to the biplane. First, since the
law that enabled her to execute her judgment against a broader range of
property was passed after she obtained her judgment," 2 and after the
biplane's arrival in the United States,"' it is questionable whether she had
a reasonable expectation of ever collecting her judgment by enforcing it
specifically against the biplane. Moreover, because the TRIA authorizes
her to reach a wide range of property, and because other blocked Cuban
assets are available," 4 her expectations do not hinge on her ability to take

though it is in plain violation of treaties.... In my country we have acted upon
the conviction that where two nations deliberately and solemnly entered upon
treaty stipulations they thereby formed a sacred compact from which they could
not be honorably discharged except through friendly negotiations and a new
agreement. I was, therefore, not prepared to learn through the medium of that
great tribunal that there was a way recognized in the law and practice of this
country whereby your Government could release itself from treaty obligations
without consultation with or the consent of the other party to what we had been
accustomed to regard as a sacred instrument."
Vagts, supra note 143, at 317-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Chang Yen Hoon,
Minister Plenipotentiary of China, to James G. Blaine, U.S. Secretary of State (July 8, 1889), in
1890 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 132, 133).

210. See supranote 25.
211. See supra Part III.E (discussing the pertinent provisions of the TRIA).
212. Martinez's judgment was awarded in March 2001, see supra Part 1,and the TRIA was
passed in 2002. See supra Part III.E.
213. The TRIA actually was passed weeks after the biplane arrived. See supra Part I and note
24.
214. A 2002 newspaper article stated that there were approximately two hundred million
dollars million in blocked Cuban assets in the United States, although ninety-six million dollars of
this amount was about to be distributed to a group of plaintiffs. Roger Parloff, ForeignPolicy by
PrivateSuit, RECORDER, June 28, 2002, at 5.
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a biplane possibly worth thirty to forty thousand dollars-a de minimis
amount compared to her entire award.2t 5
In summary, application of the comparative impairment approach to
interest analysis favors application of the Hague Convention to the case of
the biplane and forces the TRIA to yield to the treaty's provision in those
narrow set of cases that involve unlawfully seized aircraft. This analysis
produces a predictable outcome and allows courts to give careful
consideration to legislative history, governmental interests, and the
potential ramifications of each possible result. In this sense, the analysis
is far more thorough than that performed under traditional canons of
construction. Given the importance of domestic and international laws
aimed at deterring international terrorism, a more vigilant analysis allows
courts to identify the intersection of domestic and international interests
and advance both interests simultaneously wherever possible. In addition,
the resolution of conflicts between treaties and statutes is much more
predictable under a comparative impairment approach. The careful
consideration of interests and policies reduces the potential for the
perverse outcomes that strict canons frequently permit.
VI. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The canons of construction do not categorically resolve the case of the
biplane, and ironically, the strict rules often conceal what is essentially
unrestrained judicial discretion. While any form of concealed judicial
decisionmaking should be troublesome," 6 in the case of the biplane we are
left with the uneasy realization that courts can modify and even nullify
American adherence to a multilateral treaty on a case-by-case basis
through the application of a set of canons that afford little ability to predict
potentially perverse outcomes. Admittedly, this tremendous range ' 2of
17
judicial discretion turns what critics have called "plaintiff's diplomacy
into what may in fact be "trial court's diplomacy."2 8 While this obviously
raises questions about the usefulness of the canons more generally, it
certainly leads to the conclusion that where treaties and statutes conflict,
a different resolution is necessary.

215. On the biplane's possible value, see supra note 2.
216. Clandestine judicial reasoning is troublesome because the parties are not given the
opportunity to bring forward arguments, case law, and public policy to aid the court's analysis.
Rather, the parties bring forward arguments confined to a strict set of canons, and the court
conducts its own review of legislative interests without giving the parties an opportunity to advise
on the real decisionmaking of the court.
217. For a discussion of "plaintiffs diplomacy," see supra note 35.
218. By "trial court's diplomacy," I mean that judges may, under the rubric of a choice-of-law
analysis, ultimately determine whether to uphold or overturn an important international agreement.
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To solve the narrower dilemma addressed in this Note, a clear
legislative solution may be the answer. An amendment to the statute
should specifically exempt civil aircraft subject to the Hague Convention
in the same manner that the current scheme exempts diplomatic and
consular properties. 1 9 However, this resolution would not solve the
broader problems of judicial discretion in intrajurisdictional conflict of
laws questions and the opportunity for "trial court's diplomacy" when that
conflict is between a treaty and a statute. In this broad sense, the case of
the biplane is a profound legal quagmire that a legislative exemption
would not resolve. Therefore, for the broader question of
intrajurisdictional conflicts, the application of comparative impairment
interest analysis can produce more predictable outcomes that take into
account the myriad short- and long-term consequences of a court's choice
between conflicting laws. Not only is it more desirable for courts to
perform an overt interest analysis so that parties may introduce relevant
legal and policy arguments, but the use of this approach may encourage
courts to adopt more comprehensive perspectives.
Congressional interests do not stop at the nation's borders. 221 In today's
global economy, and in a world still reeling from the tragic impacts of
terrorism, the use of comparative impairment interest analysis may compel
courts to recognize that choices between conflicting laws must be
evaluated in a domestic and international sphere. Indeed, where conflicts
between statutes and treaties are concerned, our national interest-in its
very broadest sense-may depend on this awakening.

219. For a discussion of the exemption for diplomatic and consular property, see supra Part
III.E. A presidential waiver could achieve the same ends, but since the TRIA requires the President
to conduct an "asset-by-asset" determination, an aircraft of such little economic worth probably
would not invite personalized executive scrutiny. See supra Part III.E (discussing the pertinent
provisions of the TRIA).
220. Indeed, the American system of governance was premised on recognition that the nation
has important interests that must be promoted or protected in the international sphere. Andrew
Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republican Constitutionalismin the FederalistEra,41 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 250, 255-56 (1997) (noting that "thinkers like James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were
embarrassed by the state of national affairs under the Articles of Confederation, particularly by the
inability of America's diplomats to promote America's interests abroad") (citing PETER ONUF &
NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF
REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814 (1993)).
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The "Little Yellow Cuban Biplane" is shown above (center). This
photograph was taken by the author in July 2003 at the Key West
International Airport, minutes before an auction to sell two other Cuban
aircraft commenced.

